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 resembles the role of ankyrin-G in axon initial
segments, where it binds to and coordinates the
localization of three proteins required for the ini-
tiation and regulation of action potentials (Nav1.6,
KCNQ2 and 3 channels, and 186-kD neurofascin)
(29, 30). Without ankyrin-G, axon initial segments
lose these proteins and express dendritic markers
(31). In epithelial cells, ankyrin-G is required both
for targeting E-cadherin to the plasma membrane
and for biogenesis of the lateral membrane (6, 17).
We hypothesize that, in addition to targeting the
CNG channel, ankyrin-G can interact with other
ROS membrane proteins, as well as proteins re-
quired for their ROS trafficking, and these inter-
actions are essential for ROS morphogenesis. A
conserved ankyrin-G–based mechanism may thus
be shared by photoreceptors, neurons, and epithe-
lial cells that accomplishes both the targeting of
membrane-spanning proteins to specialized plasma
membrane domains as well as assembly and/or
maintenance of these domains.
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The Surprising Power of
Neighborly Advice
Daniel T. Gilbert,
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2
Two experiments revealed that (i) people can more accurately predict their affective reactions to a
future event when they know how a neighbor in their social network reacted to the event than
when they know about the event itself and (ii) people do not believe this. Undergraduates made
more accurate predictions about their affective reactions to a 5-minute speed date (n = 25) and to
a peer evaluation (n = 88) when they knew only how another undergraduate had reacted to these
events than when they had information about the events themselves. Both participants and
independent judges mistakenly believed that predictions based on information about the event
would be more accurate than predictions based on information about how another person had
reacted to it.
P
eople make systematic errors when attempt-
ing to predict their affective reactions to
future events, and these errors have social
(1–3), economic (4–8), legal (9, 10), and medical
(11–22) consequences. For example, people have
been shown to overestimate how unhappy they
will be after receiving bad test results (23), be-
coming disabled (14, 19–21), or being denied a
promotion (24), and to overestimate how happy
they will be after winning a prize (6), initiating
a romantic relationship (24), or taking revenge
against those who have harmed them (3). Re-
search suggests that the main reason people mis-
predict their affective reactions to future events is
that they imagine those events inaccurately (25).
For example, people tend to imagine the essential
features of future events but not the incidental
features (26–28), the early moments of future
events but not the later moments (17, 24), and so
on. When mental simulations of events are in-
accurate, the affective forecasts that are based on
them tend to be inaccurate as well.
Attempts to improve the accuracy of affective
forecasting have generally concentrated on im-
proving the accuracy of mental simulation, and
the results have been disappointing (29–33). Some
interventions have failed (16), and those that
have successfully reduced forecasting errors in
one situation have typically failed to reduce them
in others (27, 29). But mental simulation is not
the only way to make an affective forecast. The
17th century writer François de La Rochefoucauld
suggested that rather than mentally simulating a
future event, people should consult those who
haveexperiencedit.“Beforewesetourheartstoo
much upon anything,” he wrote, “let us first ex-
amine how happy those are who already possess
it” (34). La Rochefoucauld was essentially
suggesting that forecasters should use other peo-
ple as surrogates for themselves, and the ad-
vantages of his “surrogation strategy” are clear:
Because surrogation does not rely on mental
simulation, it is immune to the many errors that
inaccurate simulations produce.
The disadvantages of surrogation are also
clear: Individuals differ, and thus, one person’s
affective reaction is almost certainly an imperfect
predictor of another’s .B u tt h e r ea r ea tl e a s tt w o
reasons to suspect that affective reactions are not
as different as people may believe. First, affective
reactions are produced in large part by physio-
logical mechanisms that are evolutionarily an-
cient, which is why people the world over have
very different beliefs and opinions but very simi-
lar affective reactions to a wide range of stimuli
(35), preferring warm to cold, satiety to hunger,
friends to enemies, winning to losing, and so on.
An alien who knew all the likes and dislikes of a
single human being would know a great deal
about the entire species. Second, people tend to
marry, befriend, work with, and live near those
who share their preferences and personality
traits (36, 37), and thus the people from whom
they are especially likely to receive surroga-
tion information—the neighbors in their social
networks—are especially likely to share their
affective reactions. In short, there is little dis-
agreement among people about the sources of
pleasure and pain, and even less disagreement
among neighbors. These facts suggest that sur-
rogation may be more powerful than people
realize.
1Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cam-
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2Department of Psychology,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA.
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 We tested this hypothesis in two experiments.
The events we studied were (i) speed dating, in
which undergraduate women predicted how much
they would enjoy a 5-min speed date with an
undergraduate man, and (ii) peer-evaluation, in
which undergraduates predicted how they would
feel after being evaluated by a peer (38). In both
experiments, we gave participants either infor-
mation that allowed them to simulate the future
event (simulation information) or information about
the affective reaction of a fellow undergraduate
who had experienced the same event in the past
(surrogation information). We predicted that par-
ticipants would make more accurate affective fore-
casts when they knew nothing about the future
event and knew only how someone in their social
network had reacted to it.
In experiment 1, we created a speed-dating
service in which undergraduate men and women
had brief “getting acquainted” conversations. We
included 8 men and 33 women who were under-
graduates at Harvard University, unmarried, and
self-identified as heterosexual. There were eight
speed-dating sessions, each of which included
one of the eight men and between two and eight
of the women. No one participated in more than
one session. In each session, the man was first
escorted to the speed-dating room, where he com-
pleted a short personal profile listing his name,
age, height, hometown, and residence, as well as
his favorite movie, sport, book, song, food, hang-
out, and college class. His photograph was taken
and printed. Next, a woman was escorted to the
speed-dating room and left to have a 5-min pri-
vate conversation with the man. Next, the exper-
imenter escorted the woman to another room
where she reported how much she had enjoyed
the speed date by marking a 100-mm continu-
ous “enjoyment scale” whose end points were
marked not at all and very much. This report is
hereinafter referred to as her affective report.
Next, a second woman was given one of
two kinds of information: simulation information
(which consisted of the man’s personal profile
and photograph) or surrogation information
(which consisted of the affective report provided
by the first woman). The second woman was
then asked to predict (on the enjoyment scale)
how much she would enjoy her speed date with
the man. This prediction is hereinafter referred to
as her affective forecast.
After making her prediction, the second wom-
an was shown the kind of information (simulation
or surrogation) that she had not already received.
We did this to ensure that each woman had the
same information aboutthe manbefore the actual
speed date. The only difference between the two
conditions, then, was whether the second woman
had surrogation information or simulation infor-
mation when she made her forecast.
Next, the second woman was escorted to the
dating room, had a speed date, and then reported
how much she enjoyed it (on the enjoyment
scale). This report is hereinafter referred to as her
affectivereport.Thesecondwoman also reported
whether she believed that simulation informa-
tion or surrogation information would have al-
lowed her to make the more accurate prediction
about the speed date she had and about a speed
date that she might have in the future. This pro-
cess was repeated in an alternating pattern for
each additional woman until the session ended.
[For a full description of the procedure, see
(39)].
Affective forecasting error was calculated by
taking the absolute difference between the affec-
tive forecast and affective report of each woman
(except the first woman, who made no affective
forecast). Raw data may be seen in fig. S1, a
and b. Women were considerably more accurate
when they used surrogation information (mean T
SD, 11.42 T 8.70 mm) than when they used sim-
ulation information (22.38 T 10.79 mm) [t(23) =
2.78, P = 0.01]. Relative to simulation, surroga-
tion reduced the size of the affective forecasting
error by 49%. Ironically, 75% of the women
believed that simulation information would have
allowed them to make a more accurate forecast
about their date with the man they met, and 84%
believed thatsimulation information would allow
them to make a more accurate forecast about a
future date with a different man.
One potential concern about these results is
that the simulation information (which was pro-
vided by the men) may not have been entirely
accurate, and its inaccuracy may have contrib-
uted to the inaccuracy of the forecasts that were
based on it. The data do not support this sug-
gestion. If men portrayed themselves as better
than they actually were, then women who used
simulation information should have overestimated
how much they would enjoy the date. In fact,
women underestimated how much they would
enjoy the date (see supporting online text). None-
theless, we conducted a second experiment in
which simulation information was completely
accurate. In addition, we collected data on the
perceived utility of simulation and surrogation
from an independent panel of judges rather than
from the participants themselves.
Experiment 2 had three parts. In part one, 17
women and 8 men who were undergraduates at
Harvard University served as surrogates. Surro-
gates were told that they would write a story and
that a peer in an adjoining room would evaluate
the story and use it to classify them as one of
three personality types. In fact, there was no peer.
Surrogates read detailed descriptions of the type
A, type B, and type C personalities. The de-
scription of the type A personality was positive,
the description of the type B personality was
neutral, and the description of the type C per-
sonality was negative. For example, people with
type C personalities were said to “sacrifice their
beliefs because they seek contentment rather than
challenge” and “when long-term relationships
end it is usually because the person’s partner
has found a more suitable alternative.” Previous
studies have shown that few people classify
themselves as type C, and most feel unhappy
when they are so classified by a peer (24, 40).
Surrogates then wrote stories thatwere ostensibly
given to their peer in the adjoining room. Ten
minutes later, the experimenter informed the
surrogates that they had been classified as type
C by their peer. Ten minutes later, surrogates
reported their current affective state by marking a
continuous 100-mm “feeling scale” whose end
points were labeled very bad and very good.
These reports are hereinafter referred to as the
surrogates’ affective reports.
In part two, 28 men and 60 women who were
undergraduates at Harvard University served as
forecasters. Forecasters were also told that they
would write a story and that a peer would eval-
uate the story and then classify them as one of
three personality types. Half the forecasters were
randomly assigned to receive simulation infor-
mation. These forecasters were shown complete
descriptions of the three personality types and
were asked to predict (on the feeling scale) how
they would feel if their peer classified them as
each of the three types. These forecasters, there-
fore, had complete and accurate information
about the upcoming event.
The remaining forecasters were assigned to
receive surrogation information. Instead of being
shown the descriptions of the three personality
types, these forecasters were shown the affective
report of one randomly selected surrogate from
part one who had been classified as a type C, and
they were asked to predict how they would feel if
their peer classified them as each of the three
types. These predictions are hereinafter referred
to as the forecasters’ affective forecasts. After
making these forecasts, forecasters in the surro-
gation condition were shown the descriptions of
the three personality types.
All forecasters then wrote a story, were told
thattheirpeerhadclassifiedthemasatypeC,and
reported how they felt (on the feeling scale).
These reports are hereinafter referred to as the
forecasters’ affective reports.
Affective forecasting error was calculated by
taking the absolute value of the difference be-
tween each forecaster’s affective forecast and af-
fectivereport.(Rawdata may beseeninfig.S2,a
and b). As in experiment 1, forecasters were con-
siderably more accurate when they used surro-
gation information (12.50 T 14.10 mm) than
when they used simulation information (33.75 T
22.01 mm) [t(86) = 5.38, P < 0.001]. Relative to
simulation, surrogation reduced the size of the
affective forecasting error by 63%.
In part three, 23 men and 40 women who
were undergraduates at Harvard University served
as judges. The judges were told about the pro-
cedure for part one and were asked to rank sev-
eral pieces of information based on how useful
each piece would be in allowing them to estimate
the affective response of a participant. These in-
cludedsimulationinformation(completedescrip-
tions of each of the three personality types) and
surrogation information (the affective report of
another randomly selected participant). Judges
20 MARCH 2009 VOL 323 SCIENCE www.sciencemag.org 1618
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 believed that simulation information would be
moreuseful(rank,meanTSD, 1.45T0.694)than
surrogation information (2.1 T 0.718) [t(61) =
4.18, P < 0.001].
In two experiments, participants more accu-
rately predicted their affective reactions to a fu-
ture event when they knew how a neighbor in
their social network had reacted to it than when
they knew about the event itself. Women made
more accurate predictions about how much they
would enjoy a date with a man when they knew
howmuchanotherwomanintheirsocialnetwork
enjoyed dating the man than when they read the
man’s personal profile and saw his photograph.
Men and women made more accurate predictions
about how they would feel after being evaluated
by a peer when they knew how another person in
their social network had felt after being evaluated
than when they previewed the evaluation itself.
Although surrogation trumped simulation, both
participants and independent judges had precise-
ly the opposite intuition (41). By a wide margin,
they believed that simulation was more likely
than surrogation to produce accurate affective
forecasts.
Two points are worthy of note. First, sur-
rogation is by definition superior to simulation
when individual differences are relatively small
and simulations errors are relatively large, and it
is inferior to simulation when the opposite is true.
Although there is no way to know which of these
is more typical in everyday life, the situations we
studied—dating and peer-evaluation—are by no
means exotic. Furthermore, our experiments pro-
vided an especially conservative test of the power
of surrogation because participants received surro-
gation information from a person who happened
to attend the same university as they did but with
whom they had no personal relationship. In every-
day life, people are likely to receive surrogation
information from those with whom they affiliate,
and because people affiliate with those who are
similar, their surrogates are even more likely to
share their preferences and predilections. This
suggests that the potential utility of surrogation
information may be greater in vivo than our ex-
periments suggest.
Second, although our experiments demon-
strate the power of surrogation, they also suggest
that people may not normally take advantage of
this power. Our participants mistakenly believed
that simulation was the superior strategy even
after it had failed them, which suggests that peo-
ple may be reluctant to engage in surrogation if
they have the opportunity to do otherwise. Partici-
pants in the surrogation conditions of our experi-
ments were unable to engage in mental simulation
because they knew little or nothing about the fu-
ture event and thus had no choice but to rely on
the surrogation information we provided. But
given people’s mistaken beliefs about the relative
ineffectiveness of surrogation and their misplaced
confidence in the accuracy of their own mental
simulations (39), it seems likely that in everyday
life, La Rochefoucauld’s advice—like the advice
of good neighbors—is more often than not ig-
nored. When we want to know our emotional
futures, it is difficult to believe that a neighbor’s
experience can provide greater insight than our
own best guess.
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